Topological and mechanistic explanations in biology (Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2012. Part I: IHPST, Paris - CAPE, Kyoto philosophy of biology workshop) by Huneman, Philippe
Title
Topological and mechanistic explanations in biology
(Proceedings of the CAPE International Workshops, 2012. Part
I: IHPST, Paris - CAPE, Kyoto philosophy of biology
workshop)
Author(s)Huneman, Philippe




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Topological and mechanistic explanations in biology
Philippe Huneman
 
     It has often been argued that to explain means to point out the causes of some event, 
phenomenon, state of affairs, etc. (e.g. Salmon, 1984), and then uncover mechanisms 
(Machamer et al. 2000). In this paper, I will focus on a kind of explanation that is not 
straightforwardly causal, and which becomes more and more pervasive across many 
disciplines, i.e. ecology, social sciences, molecular biology, evolutionary biology or cell 
biology. 
     I first specify the differences between what I will call “mechanistic” and “topological” 
explanation. Then I consider a major set of topological explanations in ecology. Finally 
I consider mechanisms and topologies as the varieties of explanation of robustness of 
various kinds of living systems.
Topological vs. mechanistic explanations
     When we explain a phenomenon, we generally consider how the system from 
which it is a property, an outcome, a characteristic or a consequence behaves. We may 
try to determine causal relations, or to subsume several features of the system and 
its functioning under some laws of nature – those two concerns not being mutually 
exclusive. The system considered may have many properties. Some of them concern 
how, to put it vaguely, it fills a space; how parts of the system are located regarding one 
another, and whether those relations can still hold under some continuous deformations 
of the system (and which ones). Those are what I call the topological properties of the 
system. But the “parts” are not restricted to the physical parts of the system as a material 
entity; they can be parts of a more abstract space, possibly a mathematical hyperspace, 
and then be involved in such topological properties. For example, an ecological 
community is a set of individuals of various species: prima facie its parts are the 
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organisms; but on a more abstract level, one can see the species as parts. Those species 
have relations, for instance they prey on one another. The schema of their predation 
relationships is therefore a feature of the system; it takes place in a space, and can 
display topological properties. 
     I call a topological explanation, an explanation in which a feature, a trait, a property 
or an outcome X of a system S is explained by the fact that it possesses specific 
topological properties Ti. What “possess topological properties” means is the following: 
S has elements, parts, features or capacities, moments of its regular behavior, or of the 
set of its possible behaviors, which are likely to be represented in a graph, a network 
or a variety S’ in a space E. (For instance, the phase space of the system can be such a 
space.) 
     You can define a topological space on E. Once this topology is defined, S’ will have 
topological properties Ti, namely, properties which specify its invariance under some 
continuous transformations, and which will determine equivalence classes between all 
structures S’’ homotopic to S’. Or, if S’ is a graph, you can specify some properties of S’ 
(e.g. connexity; cyclicity, etc.) which will define an equivalence class, and distinguish 
S’ from other graphs S* not having those properties. Topology or graph theory thus 
provides tools to classify S’ within specific categories defined by the properties they 
have. From now on, I call “topological properties”, those properties that are either 
proper to subsets in a topological space or to some graphs and networks. 
     Topology and graph theory stricto sensu are not the same mathematic subfields. 
Those two fields, topology and graph theory, have indeed been joined in a topological 
graph theory, currently developed for its own sake (Gross and Tucker 1987). In the 
following, I consider both fields together because they are working in the same way with 
respect to what I am calling topological explanations, namely they specify the nature 
of the properties whose existence entail the fact that the explanandum happens. S has 
topological properties in virtue of its relation to S’ and its elements and relations.  
      The topological explanatory relation implies that whatever possible process Bj 
occurs to S that involves some or all elements or parts of S, no Bj is necessary to account 
for X, but the simple fact that S realizes Ti entails as a consequence the fact that S has X. 
We therefore have a topological explanation when none of the Bj is needed to explain. It 
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may be that a given X causally results from some Bj, but that what explains X is not the 
Bj itself; the reason would be that another causal process Bk also produces X, but that 
the topological properties Ti which constrain in the same way all processes Ti, entail 
that whatever the process Bj, the outcome will be of type X, so that the causal process 
Bj itself does not make any difference (conditionally on the fact of Ti) to the outcome 
and is therefore not explanatory. And unlike a mechanism or a process, a topology is not 
something that takes place in time: so those kinds of explanations are of very different 
kind than the uncovering of mechanisms or the understanding of specific processes. 
Explanation of X goes like a relation of entailment between topological properties Ti 
and X or features of X, and not like the display of a mechanism from which X would be 
a temporal outcome. 
     I draw this contrast between Bj and Ti to emphasize the fact that topological 
explanations are exclusive of explanations which pinpoint some mechanisms, or 
some specific causal interactions between elements of S underlying mechanisms, as 
explanatory relevant. What are at stake when someone unravels a mechanism or a 
process are the specific causal relations uncovered between elements. However, in the 
explanations considered here, those specific causal relations are irrelevant; what counts 
is the fact that there are relations in S’, the associated shape of S in space E, because the 
patterns of relation in S’ can define a topological structure with its properties realized by 
S and then be explanatory of X. 
The topological explanations of ecological stability
     The relationship between the diversity of species in an ecological community and the 
stability of this community is a longstanding debated topic in ecology (McCann 1998). 
Although often supported by ecologists, the idea that diversity would yield stability was 
not demonstrated until the 1970s. May (1974) formally demonstrated that in fact, if you 
consider that species are randomly connected, more diversity would imply less stability 
in terms of the constancy of frequencies of individuals. This prompted ecologists to 
realize that the exact meanings of stability and diversity were central issues. Functional 
diversity, for example, cannot be equated with number of species, since one could 
have many species preying on the same preys, being therefore functionally equivalent. 
And as it turned out, if stability is understood as the constancy of some property like 
the biomass (Tilman, 1996), then diversity enforces it. So many varieties of diversity-
stability hypotheses, often involving complexity (Pimm, 1984), flourished during the 
past two decades. (Pimm, 2001). Some of those (Solé and Montoya 2001; Dunne et al. 
2002; McCann et al. 1998; Montoya and Solé 2002; Montoya et al. 2006 – after Yodzis 
1989; Dunne 2006) considered only three parameters describing diversity: the number of 
species and their average number of links, the number of connections realized between 
species as compared to the number of possible connections (connectance), and the 
distribution of the connections between species. These hypotheses provide examples of 
topological explanations.
     The general aim of these studies consists in specifying for a community S the 
network S’ of relationships between species, each interaction being represented by a link, 
and then inferring from properties of this network some properties concerning stability, 
resilience, etc. In ecology, two species can have several kinds of causal relations: A 
can prey on B, be the prey of B, compete with B, be mutualistic or commensal with B, 
or parasitic on B, for example. However, in those networks, the nature of interactions 
between species - whether A preys on B, or is parasitic on B, or is preyed on by B etc. - 
is not relevant, but only their number and the global shape of the connections between 
them as represented by a graph (Montoya et al. 2006). 
     If we want to explain why an ecological community is stable, or which communities 
are more likely to be stable, we can consider how they react to invading species, or 
extinction of some of their species. The stable ones are the communities where those 
events don’t have many consequences upon the repartition of species or the frequencies 
of individuals in those species; the less stable are the ones that undergo dramatic changes 
in composition. There can be a simple ecological explanation for that: suppose that an 
ecological network has a few hubs that are vastly connected, and many species that are 
not very connected. Concretely, you can identify an omnivore species, therefore being 
a hub connected to many species, and then species specialized on only one prey, which 
will comprise isolated nodes.  Now a random deletion of species will be more likely to 
touch a weakly connected node: suppose that each species is equiprobably likely to be 
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 deleted, and that you have two hubs and 464 simple nodes; then of course the deletion 
has 232 more chances to delete only an isolated node. So the whole structure of links 
won’t be altered, therefore the whole community will have some stability, in terms of 
response to species extinction or species invasion (Solé and Montoya 2001; Dunne et al. 
2002, 2002b). In this example, the community S has a network S’ and then realizes the 
property T of being “two-hubbed”, which entails this fact about probability and then its 
stability.
     A network with such pattern is not a random network, like ones mostly considered 
by May (1977), who contested that diversity enforces stability. Most of the research 
about diversity and stability consisted therefore in exploring cases where networks 
of links depart from May’s assumption that connections are random. A community 
whose associated network S’ is an ecological scale-free network will have the property 
of stability against random extinction mentioned above. In this sense proving that 
a community is so structured triggers a topological explanation of its stability. This 
property is explanatory sufficient and one does not need to delve into the details of 
who is parasitic on whom, who preys on whom, etc., to establish the causes of stability. 
The details of these processes here do not make a difference, and the stability is not 
what eventually results from a sequence of causal interactions involving the species. 
Interesting parallels have been drawn between those networks and the Internet, as 
well as cell metabolic pathways and networks of words in texts (Solé and Valverde et 
al. 2001), or between ecological networks and financial networks (Levin et al. 2008), 
Figure 1 An ecological network in a community 
(Silkwood Park, after Solé et al. 2002)
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especially regarding the stability requirements: all those systems realize the same 
topological properties, thus their stability is identically explained.
     Considering small worlds, Montoya and Solé (2002) have shown that their structure 
happens in some communities and also yields forms of stability, because if you break 
some links between species, the structures allows for alternative links and therefore 
preserve the general stability. For example, suppose that a trophic web is a small world: 
between two given species you always have few nodes; if you delete one (e.g., you 
suppress the predator of A preyed on by B), in the cluster near the two unrelated nodes 
are many connections to be found so you can still find an alternative pathway. Hence, 
the property of the interaction network S’ proper to a community S, of being a small 
world, explains why it is resistant to species deletion and invasion, thus why it is stable.
     Suppose indeed that many different communities Si of different species xk have the 
same interaction network S’, where a link is defined both by its relata and its strength. 
This network is a specific graph in an abstract space, and specific properties regarding 
weak links and high degree of clustering will entail the stability of the community. No 
matter which species xk in a given Si are connected through which links in the real web 
of relations realizing S’, what matters for the outcome is only the general shape S’ of the 
web of links, and the extent to which it has high degree of clustering and weak links, and 
this holds for those different communities Sj. To this extent, explaining by considering 
the topology of food webs, or more generally ecological links, abstracts away from 
the nature of causal relations, in the sense of the genuine ecological relations between 
definite species and the causal mechanisms at work within the community. Suppose that 
in S1 half of the links are of predation, and in S2 half of those links are of parasitism, and 
that the species implied in S1 and S2 are differing by 30%. If the interaction network S’ is 
quite the same (more precisely, S’1 and S’2 belong to a same equivalence class regarding 
a property of having weak links and high degree of clustering), then stability in S1 and 
S2 is explained; a detailed understanding of the processes B1 in or B2, which are different 
in S1 and S2, will not add anything to the understanding of why S1 or S2 are stable. In 
this sense, mechanistic explanations are superfluous relative to this explanandum. 
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Explaining biological robustness
     The stability of ecosystems provided us with a family of examples of powerful 
topological explanations. The explanandum, here, ranges under the rubric “stability” 
in the sense of “disposition to stay the same across changes, under some important 
ecological aspects”, and the nature of those aspects define the various stability properties 
(e.g. resilience, constancy of biomass, etc.) that communities may possess. Given this 
characterization, ecological stability is however not the only kind of biological stability; 
the robustness of biological systems in general means something very similar. Recently 
we witnessed an inflation of research programs dealing with various kinds of robustness 
of systems at all levels of the biological hierarchy. 
     By “robustness” here, and in order to encompass many different researches in the 
field, I mean keeping some parameters stable in the face of changing values of variables, 
which precisely can mean two things: a “level” definition, in the sense that change 
in low level variables doesn’t involve change in high level variables – for instance 
changing the identity of several species does not affect some general properties like 
biomass or abundance pattern; and a “functional” definition (Wagner, 2005): robust 
are those systems that are able to maintain (some of) their functions in the face of 
perturbations. Plausibly, the latter definition works better with physiological systems. 
     Canalization and homeostasis are time-honored well-known cases of robustness in 
living systems; however, properties of robustness have been found at many lower levels: 
within the metabolic networks of cells, at the level of the genome and its expression, and 
at the level of the genetic code and proteins. Very generally defined robustness properties 
range from nucleotides to ecosystems (Fig. 2), and they may require analogous or 
identical explanations in several cases. Wagner (2005) provides a groundbreaking 
synthesis of those findings. I here after give two examples of robustness at low level, and 
in the next paragraph provide a more systematic view of robustness research according 
to the explanatory distinction sketched above. 
     In general, researchers ask two types of questions about robustness at all levels: a. 
proximate: how is it ensured? and b. evolutionary – which breaks down into (b1), why 
has it evolved? And (b2) what role may it play in evolution?
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 Fig. 2. Successive circles of robustness.
     I will mostly consider here (a) and (b2). About (a), I claim that one can partition 
robustness into several classes, according to the explications for robustness, and whether 
they are topological or mechanistic (Table 1). And it may turn out that those classes are 
not concerned in the same manner by the two evolutionary questions (b).  To show why 
those two kinds of explanations are held, let’s consider two examples, which concern 
explaining the robustness of genetic sequences against mutations. If one identifies a 
feedback process that is triggered by the alteration of some nucleotide and leads to a 
restoration of some other genomic circuit, which then leads to the initial phenotypic 
state, this would clearly be a mechanistic explanation. On the other hand, an explanation, 
instead of appealing to any mechanism, may simply cite some properties of the genetic 
code, namely, the redundancy of some triplets of nucleotides coding for amino acids. 
What is at stake here are the properties of the mapping between DNA sequences and 
proteins: due to redundancy, which is a topological property of this mapping, many 
random changes in nucleotides will not change anything because they will turn a 
codon into a synonymous codon. This explanation works in the same way as the quasi-
scale-free network explanation of stability of some ecosystems, and does not need the 
unraveling of any specific causal interaction. 
     At many levels of the biological hierarchies, you can find these two kinds of 
explanations of robustness coexisting, as is shown in Table 1. This is exactly like 
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regarding the explanation of community stability, one can either identify a feedback 
mechanism, starting from the extinction of a species, and leading to the replacement by 
a functionally equivalent species, via the creation of a vacant niche and the increased 
probability for a speciation towards a new species filling this niche (mechanistic 
explanation), or turn to the topological properties of the ecological web as explanatory 
(topological explanation).
Table 1.Kinds of explanations of biological robustness.
     The philosophical main point here, is that topological explanations are 
overrepresented when it comes to explain robustness, because they are very well fit to 
explain robustness, since robustness is a kind of invariance, and topological properties 
are in general specifying invariances (therefore allowing to define equivalence classes, 
be it in classical topology or in graph-theory).
Conclusions
     This paper intended to make sense of a difference between two kinds of explanation: 
mechanistic ones, absolutely pervasive in natural sciences and aiming to display causal 
processes responsible for an explanandum – and topological ones, which do not consider 
mechanisms at stake. The latter kind is more and more frequent because of both the 
science of networks, which emerged in the wake of the general focus on complexity – 
and the “neutrality” theme in ecology and biology. An important part of the explanations 
of robustness of many kinds (resilience, stability, etc.) in many systems relies on 
topological considerations. 
Mechanisms
 ・  Feedback control
     (physiological homeostasis;
      lactose operon)
 ・  DNA repair systems (-> fct 
     of sex (Michod and 
     Bernstein 1996))
Topology
 ・  Modularity
 ・  Redundancy
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